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THE APPOINTING

AND

REMOVAL POWER

OF THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED

By Charles E. Morganston. U. S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1929. Pp. xv, 224.
Dr. Morganston has rendered a service in assembling and summarizing
the data with reference to the power of the President to appoint and remove
officials.
As to the power of appointment there has never been any serious question,
even though Article 2, Section II, has not the same clarity as other portions
of the Constitution. While its classification of officials, some of whom are
denominated as "inferior" and others, by inference, as "superior", is not clearly
indicated, but few serious questions have arisen under this clause of the Constitution, and these have been settled by the great rule of practical construction.
Dr. Morganston's brochure has its real interest in its compilation of the
historical data and judicial decisions in respect to the more difficult question
of the right of the President to remove officials. The origin and basis of this
right of removal has been one of the great historic controversies of American
politics. It has always been of vital interest, for it concerned the equilibrium
of power, which the Constitution vainly sought to maintain between the executive and legislative departments of the government. While the framers
affected to follow the doctrine of Montesquieu as to the division of government into independent departments, the influence of Montesquieu's philosophy
was far less than is generally supposed. While they intended to create a
strong executive who would not be merely a political vassal of Congress, yet,
fearful of this objective, they sought to limit his power so that the President
would not be in fact, as he was not to be in name, a King. Their attempt to
reconcile independence with inter-dependence resulted in the long controversy,
which continued for over a century, as to the power of removal.
The text of the Constitution is silent as to this power. It nowhere either
expressly vests it in the President or expressly withholds it from him. This
vexed question first arose in the First Congress of the United States and it
was ably and vigorously argued for many weeks. On the one hand, it was
contended that the right of removal was a part of the executive prerogative
and incidental to the President's duty to see that the laws were faithfully executed, and, on the other hand, it was contended that the right of removal
could only exist either by the sufferance of Congress or by its direct grant of
power. When the question was first discussed in the First Congress, many
of its members were among those who drafted the Constitution of the United
States, and the long debate in that session is among the ablest debates in the
history of Congress.
While the question of removal was temporarily disposed of in the First
Congress, it was revived with bitter acrimony in the great party battles of
the Jackson era. Webster, Clay and Calhoun were of one mind in asserting
that the power of removal could only exist by the sufferance of Congress and
was not a Constitutional prerogative of the executive. Later on, in reconSTATES.

(444)

BOOK REVIEWS
struction days, the question again flamed up when the Republican Party
attempted to cripple Andrew Johnson by denying him, in the Tenure-of-Office
Act, the power to remove any official without the consent of Congress. The
controversy culminated in impeachment proceedings against Johnson, and
while the failure of his enemies to secure two-thirds of the Senate defeated
his impeachment, yet the fact remains that a majority of the Senate were in
favor of removing the President of the United States for removing one of his
own Cabinet. The Johnson impeachment is a shameful episode in our history.
Had his enemies then triumphed the President would have been little more
than a vassal of Congress, for no President could be a true Chief Executive of
the American People if he could not remove one of his own Cabinet when
such official was guilty of a treachery towards his Chief quite worthy of Iago.
This great question, although it had been the subject of constant controversy from the beginning of the government, was never settled until October
25, 1926, in the notable case of Myers v. United States.' It is interesting and
significant that the Chief Justice, who delivered the majority opinion for the
Court, was himself a former President of the United States.
It is true that that decision may hereafter be regarded as having left
undecided some minor questions as to whether quasi-judicial bodies, like the
Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the
Comptroller General, are within the scope of the decision, and therefore the
question in all its possible phases may not be wholly at rest. But as to all
executive officers who are not quasi-judicial, it now seems clear that the power
to remove, while not in terms granted by the Constitution, is, nevertheless,
vested in the President as a part of his executive prerogative and as a necessary method of discharging his duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
While this great question of Constitutional law is thus now happily at
rest, Dr. Morganston's brief is not less useful in assembling and summarizing
the available data. This gives his work a value as a reference book. However
the work has little value as a philosophic commentary upon the President's
power of appointment and removal. In this respect it is less valuable than
the brochures of Professors Corwin and Hart, of Princeton and Johns Hopkins
respectively, upon the merits of the great question and the exact scope of the
decision in Myers v. United States. Each of these learned commentators is
somewhat critical of the very able opinion of Chief Justice Taft in the Myers
case. It might seem to be an impertinence for students of Constitutional law,
even if they are professors in renowned universities, to sit in judgment upon
an opinion of the Supreme Court. However, the development of the Constitution is an evolution which is largely influenced by public opinion, and as
no decision of a Supreme Court is in all respects a last word upon any subject,
it serves a useful end that men who are really profound students of the Constitution should express independent judgment upon the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in any Constitutional case.
Such opinions serve the same purpose as dissenting opinions of the Court.
The writer of this opinion is a believer in dissenting opinions, especially in
2272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).
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Constitutional cases.2 They serve a real purpose in the development of the
Constitution, for it must always be remembered that, in this class of litigation, the Supreme Court sits, in a very qualified and restricted sense, as a
continuance of the great Convention of 1787. In interpreting the Constitution
the Supreme Court adapts it to the changing needs of the most changing nation
in the world.
Moreover, decisions in this class of cases are in the highest sense political
in nature and, as previously stated, in the long run are influenced, and properly
so, by intelligent public opinion. For this reason it is desirable that if any
Justices of the Supreme Court are of opinion that the majority of the Court
has rendered a wrong decision, or given a good doctrine an excessive application, they should say so, for when the controversy again arises in a different
form the opinions of the majority and minority justices are equally parts of
the Record, and their relative soundness is again considered by that august
tribunal which is the final interpreter of the Constitution.
While the opinions of learned commentators on the Constitution, such as
Professors Corwin and Hart, are manifestly of far less value than dissenting
opinions of Justices of the Court, yet they serve the same purpose in directing
the minds of the nation to a consideration of the question involved, and this
leads to an orderly and intelligent development of Constitutional principles.
For this reason it is a regret to the reviewer that Dr. Morganston, who quite
evidently understands the premises of the subject, has not given his own impressions as an independent thinker upon many of the questions involved in
the subject that he discusses. However, we can at least be grateful to him
Sor his industry in assembling so much valuable material and reducing it to a
form that makes it readable and not too ponderous.
While the reviewer has justified the value of dissenting opinions and even
the study of independent thinkers upon great questions upon which the
Supreme Court has expressed a comprehensive and deliberate judgment, the
reader must not infer that the writer in any way shares the doubts which
the dissenting Justices and the students of the Constitution, such as Professor
Corwin, have expressed as to the Myers decision. As the writer of this review
argued this great case for the Government in the Supreme Court and had the
satisfaction of having his contention sustained by that great tribunal, it is
natural that he believes that the decision of Chief Justice Taft-one of the
most notable in the history of the Court-had its full justification not only in
the practical construction given to the Constitution by the First Congress and
by many of those who helped to frame it, but also by the philosophy of our
institutions and the practical necessities of our, or any, government. As the
writer observed in his argument in the Myers case, to deny to the President
the right to remove an executive official, unless Congress assented, would be
to put a "To Let" sign upon the White House.
James M. Beck.
Washington, D. C.
- In the Myers case there were three dissenting opinions, two of which,
one by justice McReynolds and the other by Justice Brandeis, were lengthy
and exhaustive.
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AviATioN LAW. By Henry G. Hotchkiss. Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York,
1928. Pp. xvii, 492. U. S. AVIATION RE.PORTS. 1928. Edited by Arnold
W. Knauth, Henry G. Hotchkiss, and Emory H. Niles. United States Aviation Reports, Inc., Baltimore, 1928. Pp. xi, 67o.
Development of any new means of transportation has been accompanied by

a new means of communication, each necessitating new laws and regulations.
Now we have aviation with the radio. "Law, which has concerned itself in the
centuries of the past with matters on the ground and the oceans, has been compelled to add an entirely new field," writes W. Jefferson Davis.'
Commercial aviation and the airplane industry have become a major phase
of our business structure as well as an integral part of our transportation system. Within the past five years distinctly commercial aircraft has been developed. No greater tribute to the genius of the common law can be found than
the manner in which the law of this recently developed science has fitted itself
into the existing body of principles without any perceptible change or enlargement.
Heretofore, most of the articles on aviation law have been, to a large extent,
theoretical and speculative, proposing different and conflicting policies and conjectures. Five years ago, the interested lawyer expected conflicting decisions.
But as cases have come before the courts there has been a most satisfactory
uniformity of decision which should satisfy not only the legal theorist but the
business man engaged in aeronautical activity as well. This aspect of aviation
law is also reflected in recent publications. The one hundred pages of text in
Aviation Law is a comprehensive and concise presentation of the subject. U. S.
Aviation Reports is a source book for Mr. Hotchkiss' text. It is intended to
include all aviation cases to date, although Application of Gettysburg Flying
Service, Inc., where the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission held that it
would assume jurisdiction over aircraft for hire, the only known case on the
subject, is omitted. The editors propose to follow by supplements and additional
volumes. It contains an excellent and comprehensive index. Just as there are
reports for Admiralty, Banking, Bankruptcy, Public Utilities and the like, reports
for the aviation specialist are quite appropriate.
That each nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space
above its territory and territorial waters is now the generally accepted doctrine.
There is no "freedom of the air" in this respect. That principle is embodied in
the 1919 International Flying Convention of Versailles, the Havana Pan American Convention of I928 and the Air Commerce Act of 1926. The United States
is not a party to the International Flying Convention of igig. A recent news
item states that ex-President Coolidge favored the view of those who believe
an aviation treaty should be promulgated but that the Department of Commerce
advised further study before a final decision should be made.
Perhaps more words have been written and more dicta inserted in opinions
on the absolute right of the owner of the soil to the air space above, without
having any practical effect on actual decisions, than upon any other situation
having to do with aviation law. It is now definitely settled by the authorities
IAir Law--The New Field (1929)

15 A. B. A. J. io7.
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that the owner has no absolute right such as would sustain an action in the
nature of trespass quare clausum fregit, although he does have a qualified right
on which an action for low or dangerous flying or nuisance would lie. As Mr.
Hotchkiss points out, "the spread of aviation will more and more establish
rights of flight that encroach upon the rights of others judged by pre-aviation
standards."
It is generally agreed that absolute liability is properly imposed on the
owner or pilot of aircraft for damage done in descent or by objects thrown or
2
dropped from the craft while in flight. Guille v. Swan&
imposed absolute liability for any and all damage incident to and resulting from flight on the ground
that a balloon is an inherently dangerous instrument. Proponents of this theory
2
find support in Rylands v. Fletcher.
But it cannot be accepted. It is needlessly
severe and tends to retard development of aviation. The established rule as to
damage incurred by descent or by falling objects should be sufficient protection
to the helpless groundsman. Modern aircraft is no more an inherently dangerous instrument than the automobile. Nor would the res ipsa loquitur doctrine be satisfactory; its application would result in a situation midway between
the theory of absolute liability and ordinary negligence, with the confusion that
has resulted from its application to other situations in tort. It is as reasonable
to apply the assumption of risk doctrine to shippers and passengers, if there are
any extraordinary risks, as it is to impose absolute liability on the aircraft.
Some propose compulsory insurance. There is no greater reason for compelling
this from aircraft than from any other carrier or transportation agency. Until
insurance actuaries meet aeronautic development, such insurance would be prohibitive.
The tendency of all courts has beer. to hold anything having to do with
flying as engaging or participating in aeronautics when applied to limitation
clauses in life or accident insurance policies. There are no reported cases on
liability insurance policies. Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and California have held
airplane pilots and mechanics to be within their workmen's compensation acts.
Prior to the adoption of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, several theories
for sustaining federal regulation were advanced. All are reflected in the act
itself. Mr. Hotchkiss agrees with the majority and generally accepted view that
the commerce clause is quite sufficient to sustain all regulation. The theory,
once urged and officially sanctioned by an American Bar Association Committee
and the War Department's legal adviser, that a constitutional amendment is
necessary because any rights assumed in the overhanging air space would be a
taking without due process from the owner of the soil, has been practically
abandoned with failure of the cuius est soion, ems est usque ad coeulnn maxim
itself to attain support.
Both Mr. Hotchkiss' volume and U. S. Aviation Reports contain, in full,
all treaties, federal and state statutes-and regulations pertaining to aviation.
For general reading, the report is as exciting and interesting as a novel.
It contains the leading cases that will undoubtedly become landmarks in our
jurisprudence. For example, Chief Judge Cardozo held that a seaplane moored
"i9 Johns 381 (N. Y. 1822).
L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (I868).
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in navigable waters was subject to admiralty jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
of Kansas approved municipal acquisition of an airport under public park
statutes. A Pennsylvania court of quarter sessions reversed a conviction for
criminal trespass for flying over posted lands. A landing airplane stampeded
cattle. A reckless pilot landing on a crowded California bathing beach, killed
two young women and was convicted of manslaughter. The Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of New York in 1914 took judicial notice of the machine
aeroplane and in 1928 that aviation is no longer an experiment. There are important Wright patent cases, a history of heavier-than-air craft. State v. Cleve4
land justifies municipal acquisition of an airport (which has been developed into one of the best and busiest in the world) as an emergency measure.
Noise from a flight of ten airplanes excused failure of plaintiff's intestate to
hear a locomotive whistle at a grade crossing.
One gets the thrills of the old balloon ascension days, as well as the passing
barnstorming tramp fliers. There is the woman who survives after catching her
finger in a rope and being carried several hundred feet in the air; the twelveyear-old boy who tried to steal a ride, did, rose three hundred feet, but did not
survive. A bad landing at a New York fair in 1914; the North Carolinian whose
foot caught in a rope, was jerked so quick his head never hit the ground, rose I5o
yards feet first, pulled himself up until his pants slipped and his head went down
again, finally climbed the rope in midair, rose 16oo feet, landed safely and was
found riding back on a bicycle by the searching party that went after him in an
automobile; the harrowing experience of pilot and three passengers on a shipwrecked seaplane attempting to weather a storm between Miami and Bimini;
the tragedy of North American Surety Company v. Pitts; ' the flier blown
from his airplane when a harmless smoke bomb turned out to be high explosive,
who was lucky enough to fall back into the airplane which caught fire but was
landed safely; and finally the California motion picture flier for whom the exploding bomb proved fatal.
Harold F. Mook.
Erie, Pa.
FEDERAL INTCOME TAXATIOx. By Joseph J. Klein.
New York, 1929. Pp. xxii, 1749, 498, IO3.

John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

Although Mr. Klein has written several books on accounting as well as
numerous magazine articles on both accounting and tax problems, this is his first
book dealing with Federal taxation.
There are, of course, other works on Federal income, profits and estate
taxes, notably Federal Tax Practice by Montgomery, Federal Taxes by Holmes,
and Federal Income anid Estate Tax Las by Walter E. Barton and Carroll W.
Browning, which are comparatively old texts on the general subject of Federal
taxation now appearing in new editions to bring the works up to date and in line
with the changes brought about by the Revenue Act of 1928. Mr. Klein's book,
however, is distinctly new and unique both in its scope and treatment.
426 Ohio App. 265, 16o N. E. 241 (1027).
6213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21, 40 A. L. R. 1171 (925).
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Orienting himself on the Revenue Act of 1928, Mr. Klein shows painstakingly and step by step just what improvements and changes have been wrought
in American tax law since the Federal income tax became a reality with the
passage of the Revenue Act of 1913. And he introduces his discussion with an
account of the nature of income and a brief but comprehensive statement setting
forth the history of income taxation it the United States.
Practically all books of this character are so technical that they make their
appeal only to the limited class of lawyers and accountants who are specializing
in Federal tax cases, and not to the legal profession as a whole. Mr. Klein's
treatment of this all too technical but important subject of Federal taxes is so
engrossing, however, that even those members of the profession not particularly
interested in taxation, as such, will find his book an invaluable commentary on
the many complicated constitutional questions to which the various revenue acts
have so frequently given rise. Indeed, the book is so thoroughly documented
that it is perhaps the last werd in scholarship on the subject. There is hardly
a sentence throughout the book that is not vouched for by a footnote reference
to the authority or authorities for the opinion or conclusions stated.
Besides pointing out the pitfalls one encounters when endeavoring to interpret revenue laws and explaining the peculiar accounting methods employed for
income tax purposes, (Mr. Klein is both a lawyer and a certified public accountant) the author discusses in masterly fashion the difference between taxable and
non-taxable income, gains and profits as distinguished from ordinary income,
the importance of proper bookkeeping and correct inventories, deductions allowed by law for business expenses, interest, taxes, losses, bad debts, depreciations, as well as the principles governing depletion, valuations, sales, the basis for
gain or loss and the far-reaching consequences that may result from a tax standpoint through exchanges and reorganizations, corporate affiliations, tax avoidance and tax evasion. Every substantive provision of the law is fully explained.
And within the compass of comparatively few pages the reader may also learn
just how to file a tax return, how to file a claim for refund or credit for overpayment of tax, and what procedure to follow in protecting his own or any taxpayer's rights before the Treasury Department, the United States Board of Tax
Appeals, the various United States District Courts, the United States Court of
Claims and the respective United States Courts of Appeals and finally the
Supreme Court of the United States, a subject that volumes have already been
written about. The 1749 pages of textual matter are supplemented by a comparison of the Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, various Treasury Department
forms and explanatory memoranda. Not the least valuable part of the book
consists of the tables of Court and Board of Tax Appeals Decisions complete to
date of publication. As is usual with all such works, however, the index could
have been improved upon.
On the strength of this single volume work, Mr. Klein may pride himself on
having written one of the clearest and most interesting treatises in an unusually
difficult and not altogether inviting field of legal research.
Joseph Conrad Fehr.
Washington, 1). C.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A SUBSTITUTE

FOR DIPLOMACY.

Redlich. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., Chicago,

By Marcellus Donald

1928.

Pp. vii, 2o8.

The past fifteen years have brought to the attention and consideration of
the thinking people of the world the necessity of limiting warfare and the
possibility of its abolition. Many propositions have been made and many books
written to advocate plans for the abolition of war. The book by Mr. Redlich
is not like several that have appeared in which fanciful schemes have been
suggested-fanciful at least to those who having knowledge of History and
Law, discover in the schemes loopholes or contingencies unprovided for.
Mr. Redlich suggests not new nor imaginary means but rather a logical
use of means already at hand but not yet sufficiently developed. The title of
his book crystallizes his thesis. Quoting from the preface, "It is the belief of
the author that diplomacy can never succeed as a substitute for warfare; that
the diplomat is the assistant, not the rival of the soldier; and that peaceful
settlement of international disputes can only be secured to the extent that both
soldier and diplomats yield place to the international lawyer". He proceeds
in the course of two hundred pages to reach the conclusion concisely stated,
"that the abolition of the use of force in the settlement of international disputes must follow along the same lines of evolution as has the abolition of
force in the settlement of private disputes". In the interest of civil society it
has long been appreciated that private disputes are less disturbing to a community and to the progress of civilization generally when they are settled by
legal and judicial proceedings instead of by battle, ordeal, or self-help of any
sort.
As Mr. Redlich's book is intended for the general reader rather than for
those who are already familiar with studies in International Law and Diplomacy,
he has devoted five of his six chapters to an outline of the history of these two
phases of international relations.
The closing chapter of the book gives us the matter for which we waited
somewhat impatiently throughout the preceding pages.

Some of Mr. Redlich's

observations are worthy of noting. "There are three professions to which a
country may intrust the settlement of its international disputes-the soldier,
the diplomat, and the international lawyer". When the international lawyer
was called upon to represent his country in disputes submitted to arbitration,
the diplomats of the country were for the time relegated to the background.
When the countries of the world created the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at the Hague they approved arbitration for all possible occasions. "The
Covenant of the League of Nations, whatever else it was or was iot, was the
triumph of the international lawyer over the diplomat." The greatest triumph
of all for the international lawyer would be the complete success of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. "Such a victory would relegate
the diplomat to a very secondary place (except in the drawing room)".
In this chapter Mr. Redlich asks where the greater advance has been made,
in the field of international disputes or in the field of domestic disputeswhere settlement has been left to the lawyer and the judge? He notes and
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discusses a rivalry between the diplomat and the international lawyer. He
refers to the settlement of the boundary between the United States and Canada
by seven arbitration commissions and observes that this peaceful frontier was
determined by international judges and lawyers rather than by soldiers or
diplomats. He praises the United States and several of the South American
states for early use of arbitration. Then follows a rather full description
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration developed by the Hague Conventions
of i899 and 1907, and of the Judicial Arbitration Court-which never came
into existence-and of the Central American Court o Justice.
The concluding sections of Mr. Redlich's book are given to a discussion
of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice.
"As between diplomat and international lawyer, as well as in all other respects,
the League of Nations was a compromise and therefore, not entirely satisfactory to anyone." It, however, was "the first widespread attempt to substitute impartial justice as the arbitrator of international disputes in place of the
trickery and deceit of the diplomat, and the cruelty and brute force of the
soldier." The best thought of the world was fully ready for a plan which
would settle international disputes without calling upon the diplomat or the
soldier, but the nations were fully as suspicious of each other at the end of the
war as during it. Thus, while the general framework of the League was being
constructed, all eagerly welcomed the effort, but jealousy and suspicion ruled
when details were being discussed, and an organization which should have
been controlled by international lawyers became rather an organization of
diplomats.
The creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice is the
longest step yet taken from warfare and diplomacy toward international law.
Mr. Redlich explains in detail the organization and procedure of the court
and recites the names of the nations which have accepted the clause for compulsory reference to the court and answers the objection that the decrees of the
court have no force for their execution by saying that even the Supreme
Court of the United States has not always been able to enforce its decrees,
and that the force back of the decisions of the Permanent Court of International justice will be the same as that back of all national and local courtsgeneral public opinion.
Every war is caused by the assertion by each participant that injustice
has been done by the other. As long as the soldier and diplomat contend that
each nation must be the judge of the justice of its own cause, force will be
the primary method for settling disputes. "War can only be abolished when
countries are willing to submit the justice of their position to the judgment of
an impartial tribunal. . . . Every step toward compulsory arbitration, every
step toward the creation of true international courts, is a step away from the
horrors of warfare."
G. E. Fellows.
Univ. of Utah, Salt Lake City.
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ITALIAN CORPORATIVE LAW. (Diritlo Corporativo Italiaiw.) By Carlo Costamagna. Second Edition. Unione Tipografico Editrice, Italy, 1928. Pp.
viii, 622.
The impression given by the average tourist returning from Italy is that of
a land where the trains run on time and beggars are no longer to be found on
the streets; if he is somewhat more than ordinarily observing he will perhaps
add that it is wiser while in Italy not to discuss Fascism publicly, or to make
remarks that might be construed as derogatory to Mussolini. Those of us who
have not been in Italy recently, but who absorb a certain amount of world
culture from the perusal of "Time" or the "Literary Digest" are aware that
Mussolini and his fascists marched on Rome a few years ago and with little
or no bloodshed seized the reins of government and that since then, under
Mussolini's dictatorship, some sweeping transformation has been effected in
Italy's economic arrangements whereby she has been able to stabilize her currency and increase her production.
Whether we be sceptics or believers in democracy, students of contemporary
Italian history or laymen, Mr. Costamagna's thorough-going and exhaustive
explanation of the legal structure whereby Italy has been transformed from a
political democracy into the Fascist State offers much food for thought The
book is more than a technical explanation of certain statutory laws; it is a
philosophical treatise on Industrialism, based on the denial,-or at least the
complete subjection,--of all individual personality, and the personification in
lieu thereof of the State. This doctrine is set forth logically and with unfaltering assurance.
The Corporative State is not an abstraction devised for the greater happiness of all the individual human beings comprising the Italian people; the State
is the ultimate reality, and the individual the abstraction; as such he must be
conceived of primarily in his relation to the state and to the part he can best play
in the efficient economic functioning thereof.
The author's approach to this point of view is historical. In the opening
chapters he discusses the "natural laws of association", pointing out that from
the earliest times men have banded together to achieve common purposes,
and reviews the history of the colleges, guilds, etc., of Roman and Medieval times and the rise of trade unionism and syndicalism in the past century.
This increasing tendency toward association has not been confined to the
workers; witness the development of trusts, pools and cartels, which are
similar syndicates of entrepreneurs,--of capital, in brief. The natural evolution
of this concept of syndical freedom under the doctrine of "socialistic liberalism" could lead only to deadlock in the Liberal State, and result in strikes
and lock-outs, with capital and labor struggling for advantage to the detriment
of national well being. Costamagna is scornful of the sorry plight resulting
from the free play of syndical liberty; the theory, he holds, inevitably breaks
down because it recognizes rights without corresponding duties, and provides
for no intervention by the public power in the general interest.
Italy, in the years immediately following the war was reduced almost to a
state of anarchy by the syndicalist struggles; the State was hesitant and powerless to intervene in the class struggle. With the seizure of political power by
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Mussolini, the Fascists undertook a complete economic and political reorganization of Italy. The present book deals with the "Corporatkve Law" of April 3,
1926 and the regulations for its enforcement promulgated in July of the same
year, which cover the economic aspects of this reorganization.
Perhaps the fundamentals of the philosophy underlying this legislation can
best be understood by quoting two significant passages from the "Charter of
Labor":
"III Organization whether by syndicates or by trades is unrestricted,
but only the legally recognized syndicate, subjected to the control of the
State, has the right legally to represent the whole category of employers or
employees for which it has been formed . . . to draw up collective labor
contracts binding upon all belonging to this category."
"XI The trade associations are charged with the regulation, by collective contracts, of labor relations between the employers and employees whom
they represent. .. ."
The Labor Charter, while not a part of the Corporative Law, sets forth
the general principles of the Fascist State as regards labor-capital relations
in philosophic rather than legal terms.
Signore Costamagna discusses in detail the structure and functioning of
the Corporative State,--through some 6oo pages. The book is divided into six
parts, dealing respectively with "General Notions"; "The Trade Association";
"The Collective Contract of Labor"; "Jurisdictions of Labor"; "Offenses and
Penalties", and "The Corporative Arrangement."
Obviously, to do justice to so monumental a work in a brief review is impossible; I must content myself with comment on a few random passages
that seem to me to bring out the central idea in this elaborate structure.
"The corporative principle is understood, as regards the individual, as
the subordination of the individual to the integrated and directed action
of the group to which he by trade belongs; as regards the State, as the
subordination of the same group to the general interests that the State personifies with, at the same time, recognition on the part of the State of the
exclusive representation in the group of the trade category that it individualizes.
"The direct antithesis between the individual and the State that
threatens the downfall of the individualistic regime, is eliminated by the
intervention of a third subject of public law, which is destined by its very
nature to exercise a great influence in all orders of public functions, attaining an organic and integrated collaboration between the citizen and the

State." (Article

172.)

One feels here very clearly the complete submergence of the individual.
The State, far from being conceived as a mechanism devised for the convenience
of individuals, seems to be looked on as an end in itself; the corporative principle is a felicitous device to prevent the individual, or groups of individuals,
from giving the State too much trouble.
My hope is that I may have placed before the reader a few sound bits of the
kernel ;-to compress this book into a nutshell so that the reader of this review
might fully understand the Corporative Law is not my intention. The book is
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exhaustive and the history and theory supporting each cog in the legal machinery of the Fascist State is well developed, but I can here attempt only to
give the net impression Signore Costamagna has left in my mind as to what
has happened in Italy,-with a surmise as to why it has happened.
The picture we get is of a modern state founded de novo since the March on
Rome in October 1922, on the principle Of mass production, and the realization
that economic considerations are increasingly more important than political. The
logic is remorseless; the Fascist philosophers have not allowed the sentiments
of the deeply scorned schools of individualistic democracy, or of socialistic
liberalism, to cloud their thinking. In the modem highly industrialized world
natioral success depends upon mass production, and the state that aspires to
hold the rank of a Great Power must develop its organization of production at
all costs. Friction between the various factors of production cannot be tolerated, hence-runs the Fascist argument-the individual, be he employer or employee, must be subordinated to the group; the groups must be integrated into
National Confederations and conflicting interests must be subjected to the control of the State through the Ministry of Corporations and the Labor Courts,
to the end that production in the Corporative State may flourish like the green
bay tree.
Speculation as to underlying motives may seem gratuitous in discussing
a legal structure so carefully reasoned and logical as the Fascist State, but it
is after all a human institution and those of us who still adhere to the finer
traditions of American political democracy have so deep a respect for the human
will for freedom that we may perhaps be pardoned if we question the permanence of the surrender by the Italian people of their individual will and aspirations to control by a logical but artificial economic State. One wonders whether
a closer study of the Fascist movement might not reveal as the corner stone
of this whole edifice a very old and very powerful emotional urge-national
aggrandizement. Such a motive might conceivably supply to the organism of
the Corporative State a life-giving blood stream of which it would seem to be
deprived by the restriction of individual freedom. It is not possible that this
whole structure, with its limitations on human freedom and its substitution
therefor of loyalty to a superimposed economic state, is a rationalization of
the Fascist leaders' vision of Italy as a perfectly integrated industrial machine,
dominating Europe by her economic power, and dominated in turn by the
Fascist Party-and by the "Head of the Government"? Through it all does
not one hear too frequently the sinister echo of the old phrase "l'Etat, c'est
ilno"?
E. Lewis Burnham.
Philadelphia.
By Harry D. Nims.
Baker Voorhis & Company, New York, 1929. Pp. cliv,

THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS.

Third Edition.
1293.

It has been twelve years since the second edition of this widely known and
oft-cited book was published. The rapid developments of important parts of
trade law during that period amply justify a new edition. The present edition
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contains 400 more pages and cites and discusses many more cases than the
second edition. The general plan of the book is the same and the section numbering remains the same. Many new sections are inserted but they are indicated
by adding a letter suffix. Therefore section references to the old edition are also
good to the new. The mechanical arrangement of the book is highly satisfactory. It contains a complete table of cases, a minute index and the table of
contents is annotated to both sections and pages. The appendix contains the
trade-mark statutes, the rules of the patent office for registering a trade-mark
and forms.
On some of the newer questions involved in the subject of trade law Mr.
Nims gives his readers the benefit of intelligent and lucid comment. The author
is to be commended for his vigorous criticism of the doctrine that trade-mark
protection does not extend beyond the area of the owner's trade activity. He
makes it clear that he is opposed to the principle which permits the use of
another's mark in new localities. Modem rapidity of communication and travel,
he says, have destroyed whatever validity there ever was in such a principle.
In his section, "Threats to Good Will", the author approves of the doctrine
that use of a trade-mark upon goods dissimilar in kind from those sold by the
first user of the mark, should frequently be restrained because, although there
is no diversion of patronage, the reputation of the first user is placed in the
hands of the second user and is a continual threat to his good will. This view
seems sound and the more recent decisions are inclined to support it.
The author condemns as unsound the arbitrary placing of goods into
classes and limiting trade-mark protection to use upon goods falling within a
class. He quite accurately says:
"The test of infringement is not to be found in arbitrary distinctions
between goods, based upon the character of the goods. It can be found by
determining whether, quite regardless of the character of the goods, the
result of the defendant's use is to confuse, deceive or injure or to threaten
to confuse, deceive or injure the consumer, and hence to injure the plaintiff."
(P. 579.)
There are, however, many trade law problems which the courts have been
unable to satisfactorily analyse, toward whose solution I fear Mr. Nims does
not offer a great deal of help. There is too much quoting of opinions and not
enough of comparing, contrasting, weighing and analysing the court's decisions. Mr. Nims is too often satisfied with the reasons stated by the courts
without testing them in the crucible of jurisprudence. Is a trade-mark property? What is the difference, if any, between the scope of protection given a
name or mark under so-called technical trade-mark law and under the law of
unfair competition? These are illustrations of questions that seem to the
reviewer inadequately dealt with in this volume.
Mr. Nims says:

"Radical distinctions have been made by various courts between pure
trade-mark cases and cases under the general rule of unfair competition. It
has been said that a trade-mark has been protected on the ground of property
right while relief in cases of unfair competition is based upon fraud."
(P. 521.)
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The author seems satisfied with this distinction. But are the legal relations
in the two cases the same? With respect to whether a trade-mark is property
it is not much help to simply assert "If the owner of a trade-mark possesses
property rights in his mark they are unlike other property rights. The better
term is 'rights'" (p. 522). But in what respect are trade-mark rights different from other property rights? Perhaps the difference is that given in the
Hanover case and quoted by Mr. Nims as follows:
"Property connotes a right in rem i.e.
the right to exclude the whole
world from any use of the thing in question. A trade-mark owner can
exclude only from a use which causes confusion." (P. 522.)
That is, for there to be property according to this view there must be an exclusive privilege of user. But that cannot be the test of a property right. Who
would say that a lessor, a bailor, or a remainderman has no property interest?
Such a person has many valuable "rights". For example he has rights that the
possessor and others shall not commit certain acts of harm upon the "property". He has also power to transfer his interest. He has immuities,--that
his interest shall not be divested without his consent, etc. These and other
relations constitute his property interest. Yet his present privilege of user is
very much curtailed if it is not entirely absent. The privilege to presently use
the property is almost entirely in others. A landowner's interest is subject to
the privilege of others coming upon his land in certain cases of necessity, and
public utilities may acquire, without the consent of the owner, by exercise of
eminent domain, the privilege of entering upon and using another's land.
Although there is some controversy as to whether it is accurate to speak of the
owner of land as "owning" the oil and gas beneath the surface, it has never'
been denied that the owner of the land has a "property interest" in such oil and
gas. Yet others have the privilege of drawing off and taking such oil and
gas by sinking wells upon their own land. The owner has a privilege to take,
but others have a similar privilege. In all of these cases the privileges of the
"owner" are limited by the privileges of others. But despite such limitation
the "owner' has a property interest. The existence of such privileges in others
does not of itself negative the existence of a property interest in the "owner'%
Property in a trade-mark in many respects is similar to property in oil and gas
in situ. The "owner" has a privilege to use, but within certain limits others also
have the privilege of user.
It is believed that it makes no difference whether the protection given to
a mark comes about through so-called technical trade-mark law or through
rules of unfair competition, the result is a property interest in either case.
Mr. Nims says that to be guilty of unfair competition is to be guilty of a
fraud,--that is, of a tort. But principles of tort play an important part in
determining what property it.That another shall not trespass upon my land
is a principle of torts as well as of property.
It is submitted that a more precise determination by the author of the
exact legal relations involved would have aided materially in clearing up many
of the difficulties found in the law of trade-marks and unfair competition.
Another major criticism of Mr. Nims' work the reviewer would like to
offer is that the book gives hardly any consideration to the Clayton and Federal
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Trade Commission Acts, or to the many important decisions interpreting the
sections of those acts having to do with unfair competition. It cannot be said
that these acts and the decisions under them lie beyond the scope of such a
book as this. The main title of the book is "Unfair Competition", and the two
acts referred to deal specifically with that subject. It seems to me those acts
and the decisions under them constitute the most outstanding development of
the last fifteen years in the law of unfair competition. Yet for all that appears
in this book one would hardly know such statutes had been enacted.
What effect, if any, does section 3 of the Clayton Act have upon 'the
validity of exclusive dealing contracts? To what extent may a manufacturer
discriminate in his sales to wholesalers, chain stores and retail buyer's associations? Under what circumstances, if any, is it justifiable for a manufacturer
or dealer to refuse to sell or to sell only on extortionate terms? Does section
2 of the Clayton Act make illegal the seller's increasing of his price to a particular buyer in order to lessen competition among buyers or does it simply
prohibit local or special price cutting in order to drive out the competitors of
the seller? Mr. Nims does not cite, much less discuss, the important cases
involving these problems.
Under what circumstances, if at all, is resale price maintenance an "unfair
method of competition" under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act? Mr. Nims leaves us in the dark on this important topic. Here again
neither citation nor discussion is given to the cases involving this question.'
'See the following: United Shoe Co. v. U. S., 258 U. S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct,
(1922); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346,
42 Sup. Ct. 360 (1922); Fed. Trade Com. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U. S. 568,
43 Sup. Ct. 210 (1922); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,
273 U. S. 359, 47 Sup. Ct. 400 (1927) ; Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; Pictorial Review Co.
v. Curtis Pub. Co., 255 Fed. 206 (S. D. N. Y., 1917); Auto Acetylene Light
Co. v. Prest-O-Light Co., 276 Fed. 537 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) ; Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Fed. Trade Com., 276 Fed. 686 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921); Mennen Co. v.
Fed. Trade CoM., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Pearsall Butter Co. v.
Fed. Trade CoM., 292 Fed. 720 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923); National Biscuit Co. v.
Fed. Trade CoM., 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Butterick Co. v. Fed.
Trade Com., 4 F. (2d) 91o (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Porto Rico Amer. Tobacco
Co. v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 30 F (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
For a discussion of the problem involved in some of these cases see
Oliphant, Trade Regulations (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 21o and Mechem, Price
Discrimination as Unfair Competition (1923) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 852; (1924)
38 HARV. L. REv. 1O3. See also the more recent case of Van Camp v. American
Can Co., 49 Sup. Ct. 112 (1929) and comment thereon in (1928) YALE L. J. 804.
' See the following: Fed. Trade Com. v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S.
441, 42 Sup. Ct. 150 (1922) ; Hills Bros. v. Fed. Trade Com., 9 F. (2d) 481
(C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Toledo Pipe Co. v. Fed. Trade Com., ii F. (2d) 337
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; Cream of Wheat Co. v. Fed. Trade Com., 14 F. (2d)
40 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Hubbard v. Fed. Trade Com., 15 F. (2d) 274 (C. C.
363
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See also Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance, (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 676;
Stevens, Resale Price Maintenance, (1919) 19 COL. L. REV. 256; Fausig, Price
Maintenance, 6 AmI. Eco.T. REV. 170; and for comments upon some of the
above cases see (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 248; (1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 389;
(1922)

31 YALE L. J. 650; (1922)

REV. 229; (1922)

22 COL. L. REV. 351; (1922)

4 ILL. L. Q. 263; (1928)

13 IOWA L. REV. 324.
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What is the difference in regard to resale price control, between a manufacturer's distributing his commodities by means of sales and by means of
"agencies"?' When, if at all, is a "tying" contract an unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act?,
Mr. Nims has a section on "Use of False Advertising", one on "Misrepresentation in Advertising", and one on "Use of Falsehood", yet there is no
mention made of the effect of the Federal Trade Conmnission Act on false
advertising as a type of unfair competition, nor of the important decisions on
this question.' Nor is there any reference to the character or content of
numerous state statutes on false advertising.6
For some reason, hard for the reviewer to understand, Mr. Nims has seen
fit to ignore in his book the mine o'f magazine material that is available upon
the subject of trade-marks and unfair competition. It is unfortunate that the
author did not take advantage of this opportunity to make such material more
accessible to the profession.
Despite the above criticisms, however, it is the opinion of the reviewer
that Mr. Nims has written a valuable and useful book-much the best that
has been written in the field of trade law. It should be on the desk of every
trade-mark lawyer in the country.
George W. Goble.
College of Law, University of Illinois.
'U. S. v. Gen. Electric, 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192 (1926); for a
discussion of the problems see Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance, 28
COL. L. REv. 312 and 441.
'Fed. Trade Com. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (192o).
5See the following: Fed. Trade Com. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S.
483, 42 Sup. Ct. 384 (1922) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Fed. Trade Com. 258
Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th. igig), 6 A. L. R. 358 (1920) (this case, however, cited
by the author on another point) ; Fed. Trade Com. v. Pure Silk Hosiery Mills,
3 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925); Proctor & Gamble v. Fed. Trade Com.,
ii F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Ostermoor & Co. v. Fed. Trade Com.,
6 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. Fed.
Trade Com., 26 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). See also comment (1926)
26 COL. L. Rev. i99.

'See comment

(1927)

26 YALE L. J. ii55.
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